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Abstract
Wood and Spekkens (2015) argue that any causal model explaining the EPRB
correlations and satisfying no-signalling must also violate the assumption that the
model faithfully reproduces the statistical dependences and independences—a so-
called “fine-tuning” of the causal parameters; this includes, in particular, retrocausal
explanations of the EPRB correlations. I consider this analysis with a view to
enumerating the possible responses an advocate of retrocausal explanations might
propose. I focus on the response of Na¨ger (2015), who argues that the central ideas of
causal explanations can be saved if one accepts the possibility of a stable fine-tuning
of the causal parameters. I argue that, in light of this view, a violation of faithfulness
does not necessarily rule out retrocausal explanations of the EPRB correlations,
although it certainly constrains such explanations. I conclude by considering some
possible consequences of this type of response for retrocausal explanations.
1 Causal models, quantum mechanics and faithfulness
In the 1960s, Bell (1964, 1966) showed that, given some reasonable assumptions, any lo-
cal hidden variable model of quantum phenomena must disagree with the predictions of
quantum mechanics, a result now known as Bell’s theorem. The predictions of quantum
mechanics were confirmed in the 1980s (Aspect et al., 1982a,b) and, thus, lest Bell’s rea-
sonable assumptions be jettisoned, it is widely accepted that certain quantum phenomena
cannot be modelled using local hidden variables. But Bell’s theorem shows more than
just the incompatibility of local hidden variable theories and quantum mechanics; it shows
that, regardless of how we model quantum phenomena, quantum mechanics violates a con-
dition that Bell called local causality: the probabilities attached to the values of some
quantum variable remain unaffected, given a full specification of the variable’s relevant
causal past, by events in some spacelike separated region (Norsen, 2009, 2011). Thus it
can be argued that Bell’s theorem shows us that quantum mechanics is incompatible with
this very basic intuitive notion of causality.
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Despite this result (or, indeed, because of it), there has been recent interest in the
relationship between causal models and quantum mechanics and this has led to the ap-
plication of schema designed to permit an inference from observed statistical correlations
to causal structure—so-called causal discovery algorithms (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl,
2009)—to the observed statistical correlations of quantum mechanics. According to the
causal modelling program, observed statistical dependences and independences between
distinct measurable elements of some system can be represented by directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) in which each vertex corresponds to the distinct variables of the system and each
edge corresponds to statistical dependence relations between pairs of variables. These
patterns of statistical dependences and independences and the corresponding graphical
structures can be interpreted as causal Bayesian networks, thereby representing a causal
structure between elements of a system. A causal structure delineates a hierarchy of
descendants (downstream variables), ancestors (upstream variables) and parents (direct
ancestors), while variables with no parents are exogenous. A causal model takes a causal
structure and specifies a conditional probability distribution for each variable given its
parents, P(X | pa(X)), which embodies the statistical dependences and independences;
the exogenous variables are, by construction, independently distributed.
In order that such causal models have the right sort of features to enable the discovery
of causal structure from observed statistical correlations, a series of constraints must be
placed on the graphical representations that are general expressions of features that we
take to be characteristic of causation. The role of these constraints is to delimit as much
as possible the underdetermination in the move from statistical data to causal structure
and they serve to clarify the scientific rationale that underlies such causal inference. Two
of these constraints are already built into the graphical structures themselves: the causal
graphs are directed (expressing causal asymmetry) and acyclic (no causal loops). There
are then three central assumptions. The first of these is that the joint distribution over
all the variables is constrained to factorise into the product of the conditional probabil-
ities, and from this follows the causal Markov condition: every variable is conditionally
independent of its nondescendants given its parents. If we were to use this inference alone
to discover the causal structure given some probability distribution, the causal structure
would remain significantly underdetermined; an equivalence class of causal structures may
in general support a single probability distribution. The second central assumption is that
any resultant causal model faithfully reproduces the statistical dependences and indepen-
dences; that is, every statistical independence implies a causal independence (or, no causal
independence is the result of a fine-tuning of the model). Finally, we must assume that
the model is causally sufficient; that is, all the common causes of the measured variables
have themselves been measured (or, no unmeasured common causes).
When certain quantum phenomena, particularly EPRB correlations, are modelled in
this framework it becomes apparent that one or more of the causal assumptions that
underlie the framework must be violated. Indeed, the usual response is that the causal
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Markov condition fails in quantum mechanics (Butterfield, 1992). This strongly suggests
that the quantum correlations cannot be modelled according to such a classical causal
framework—which is not entirely surprising given Bell’s theorem. Despite this, the quan-
tum causal modelling program is an attempt to capture the quantum correlations within
some causal modelling framework and this then requires one or more of the classical as-
pects of the framework to be appropriately modified. In this context, Wood and Spekkens
(2015) have argued that any causal structure that accounts for the quantum correlations
must violate the principle of faithfulness, concluding that the no-signalling requirement
of the quantum correlations can only be achieved in the causal modelling framework by
fine-tuning the parameters in the model.
Since the faithfulness assumption is a central assumption for the discovery of causal
structure from observed statistical correlations, the inference from Wood and Spekkens
is that the quantum correlations cannot be given a causal explanation a` la the causal
modelling program. If we were to forego the faithfulness assumption, the intuition would
be that not only would we have no way of constraining the equivalence class of causal
structures that support a single probability distribution, but we would lose our ability to
infer direct causal relations as a result of interventions on the system, since we would have
no way of knowing whether such relations were potentially subject to confounding through
fine-tuning. Thus, in accordance with the framework of Wood and Spekkens, maintaining
the faithfulness assumption leads to rejecting causal explanations in quantum mechanics.
Wood and Spekkens argue that all causal explanations of the no-signalling EPRB
correlations must violate the faithfulness assumption, and therefore should be ruled out as
viable explanations. This current work is interested in particular in the fate of retrocausal
explanations, and proceeds as follows.
I begin in Section 2 by outlining Wood and Spekkens’ argument that there is an insur-
mountable tension between the no fine-tuning assumption, the no signalling requirement
and a causal explanation of the EPRB correlations. I then introduce in Section 2.1 an
explicit example of a basic retrocausal model to illustrate to what exactly fine-tuning
amounts. Section 3 briefly considers some arguments against the no fine-tuning assump-
tion: that fine-tuning is ubiquitous and not a problem (Cartwright, 2001); that fine-tuning
that is independently justified is not a problem (Egg and Esfeld, 2014); and that fine-
tuning that is stable to disturbances is not a problem (Na¨ger, 2015). It is this latter
response on which I focus, with a view to sketching a retrocausal picture in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 that seems to satisfy the stability conditions required of the view. The main
argument of this paper is that thinking of the fine-tuning of the probabilities associated
with EPRB correlations as being grounded in cancelling probability amplitudes—as per
the Feynman path integral approach to quantum mechanics—allows the requisite stability
to circumvent the conclusions of Wood and Spekkens.
As a concluding discussion, I then speculate in Section 4.3 how (or indeed if) this retro-
causal picture could map back onto the causal modelling project. In terms of the analysis
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Figure 1: Common cause structure of the EPRB experiment.
of Wood and Spekkens, there are two general ways to do this: by accepting that stable
fine-tuning is an appropriate addition to the causal modelling project such that a causal
model of the EPRB experiment is possible, contra the conclusion of Wood and Spekkens;
or by accepting that the retrocausal picture requires sufficiently radical changes to the
causal modelling project such that the associated explanation of the EPRB correlations is
no longer a causal explanation, thus aligning in spirit with Wood and Spekkens’ conclu-
sion that no causal explanation is possible. Either way, the Wood and Spekkens analysis
does not sound the death knell for all retrocausal approaches to quantum mechanics.1
2 The “no fine-tuning” requirement
Consider, as is usual, an EPRB experiment consisting of an entangled bipartite quantum
system |ψ〉 in the singlet state and where each of the parts of the bipartite state are
subject to a local measurement—the settings variable denoted by α on one side and β on
the other—with two possible results for each measurement—the outcome variable denoted
by A on the α side and B on the β side. According to Bell’s theorem, P(A,B | α,β)
is constrained by the impossibility of a causal influence between the two sides of the
experiment—Bell’s notion of local causality (Norsen, 2011)—leading to the assumption
that any correlation must be due to a common cause λ. This can be depicted as a DAG,
as in Fig. 1 (where the variable P consists of state preparations like |ψ〉).
Applying the causal Markov condition to this graph gives us the following conditional
1To be fair, Wood and Spekkens do qualify that their analysis rules out retrocausal models that can
be represented by directed acyclic graphs, and it is debatable whether the retrocausal picture outlined in
Section 4.1 can be represented as such. More on this in Section 4.
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independences:2
(A ⊥⊥ β, B | α, λ)
(B ⊥⊥ α, A | β, λ)
which is just a statement of Bell’s local causality. From this condition, and the assumption
that there are no correlations between the settings and the hidden variables, (α ⊥⊥ β, λ)
and (β ⊥⊥ α, λ), it follows that P(A,B | α,β) must satisfy the Bell inequalities. That
there be no superluminal signalling also follows from Fig. 1, (α ⊥⊥ B | A) and (β ⊥⊥ A |
B).
Wood and Spekkens consider this problem in reverse, as per the casual discovery
schema. Rather than attempting to explain the EPRB correlations using causal struc-
ture, as Bell attempted, the casual discovery schema can be employed to illuminate the
possible causal structures from the observed statistical correlations of quantum mechan-
ics. The observed statistical correlations are, of course, marginal independence of the
settings, (α ⊥⊥ β), and no-signalling, (A ⊥⊥ β | α) and (B ⊥⊥ α | β). When the no-
signalling constraint is combined with the faithfulness assumption—that every statistical
independence implies a causal independence—we infer that there can be no (direct or
mediated) causal influences from one side of the EPRB experiment to the other (which is
just Bell’s notion of local causality). Again, it follows from this that P(A,B | α,β) must
satisfy the Bell inequalities, and thus the fact that the Bell inequalities are violated by
the EPRB correlations renders such causal discovery defective.
Apart from concluding that this set of conditional independences is “too impoverished”
for some prominent causal discovery algorithms to lead to significant insight into the casual
structure of quantum mechanics, Wood and Spekkens demonstrate a fundamental tension
between the no-signalling constraint, the faithfulness assumption and the possibility of a
causal explanation. More precisely, they show that the following three assumptions form
an inconsistent set:
(i) The predictions of quantum theory are correct—that is, the conditional indepen-
dences (α ⊥⊥ β), (A ⊥⊥ β | α) and (B ⊥⊥ α | β) are satisfied, and a Bell inequality
is violated;
(ii) The observed statistical dependences and independences can be given a causal ex-
planation as per the causal modelling program;
(iii) The faithfulness assumption holds—that is, there is no fine-tuning.
2(X ⊥⊥ Y | Z) denotes that X and Y are conditionally independent given Z:
P(X,Y | Z) = P(X | Z) · P(Y | Z).
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Figure 2: Causal relations in a basic retrocausal model.
Wood and Spekkens advocate dropping the second assumption, the contrapositive of
which is that any purported causal explanation of the EPRB correlations falls afoul of the
tension between the no-signalling constraint (first assumption) and no fine-tuning (third
assumption), including retrocausal explanations. Let us consider a basic retrocausal model
to explore this tension.
2.1 Fine-tuning in a retrocausal model
Consider the retrocausal model depicted in Fig. 2. In this model, the measurement settings
have a direct causal influence on the hidden variable λ and only an indirect cause on the
outcomes A and B. We can imagine the model to work in the following way. We begin
with an entangled bipartite quantum system |ψ〉, a pair of photons in a singlet state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+−〉 − |−+〉)
In a typical CHSH test, each of the pair of photons is subject to one of two different
local measurement—on the α side we randomly choose to measure α1 or α2, and on
the β side β1 or β2—with two possible results for each measurement, i.e. A = {+,−},
B = {+,−}. We observe that the outcomes are correlated with probability sin2 θij
2
and
anti-correlated with probability cos2
θij
2
(where θij is the angle between the measurement
settings, i = α1, α2 and j = β1, β2).
We can provide a retrocausal model of this experiment in a straightforward way: let λ
be constituted by a pair of “beables” that each encode information about their respective
measurement outcome as a function of the setting (and together encode information about
the joint measurement outcome as a function of the settings). Thus, for settings, say, α1
at α and β2 at β, we could represent the possible values of λ as (+α1 ,+β2), (+α1 ,−β2),
(−α1 ,+β2) or (−α1 ,−β2). To achieve the observed quantum probabilities, these values of
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λ need to occur in accordance with the observed probabilities; that is:
P(+i,+j | α,β) = P(−i,−j | α,β) = 1
2
sin2
θij
2
P(+i,−j | α,β) = P(−i,+j | α,β) = 1
2
cos2
θij
2
Let us check to see whether we achieve the no-signalling constraint on this casual
model. Consider (A ⊥⊥ β | α): the conditional probability distribution over the outcomes
at A is independent of the setting β given the setting α. Let us take the value of α = α2
and check whether changing the setting at β will alter the conditional probability distri-
bution of outcomes at A. First, take β = β1: λ could be any one of (+α2 ,+β1), (+α2 ,−β1),
(−α2 ,+β1) or (−α2 ,−β1), which arise with probability 12 sin2 θij2 , 12 cos2 θij2 , 12 cos2 θij2 and
1
2
sin2
θij
2
, respectively. Thus, since
P(A = +) = P(+α2 ,+β1) + P(+α2 ,−β1)
and
P(A = −) = P(−α2 ,+β1) + P(−α2 ,−β1),
then
P(A = +) = P(A = −) = 1
2
sin2
θij
2
+
1
2
cos2
θij
2
=
1
2
.
Now take β = β2: λ could be any one of (+α2 ,+β2), (+α2 ,−β2), (−α2 ,+β2) or
(−α2 ,−β2), which arise with probability 12 sin2 θij2 , 12 cos2 θij2 , 12 cos2 θij2 and 12 sin2 θij2 , re-
spectively. Thus
P(A = +) = P(A = −) = 1
2
sin2
θij
2
+
1
2
cos2
θij
2
=
1
2
.
We see then that the conditional probability distribution over the outcomes at A is the
same regardless of which setting at β we choose. We could similarly choose α = α1 and
achieve the same result. This is just the conditional independence of A and β given α.
However, we have had to “tune” the conditional probability distributions (the so-
called “causal-statistical parameters” of Wood and Spekkens (2015, p. 4)) in order to
avoid the possibility of signalling. If these probabilities were to change just slightly, this
would destroy the finely balanced independence of the measurement setting at β and
the outcome at A.3 That is, some small change in the conditional probability distribu-
tions would reveal, in terms of this example, which measurement setting were chosen at
β. (For instance, β = β1 might give us P(A = +) =
3
5
while β = β2 might give us
P(A = +) = 2
5
.) Thus we can see explicitly the problem faced by causal explanations
3Of course, in a maximally entangled state, as with |ψ〉 given above, the symmetry of the system
renders certain other independences that belie the causal model given in Fig. 2, including (A ⊥⊥ α)
and (B ⊥⊥ β) (Na¨ger, 2015, p. 8). If |ψ〉 were to slightly deviate from maximal entanglement these
independences would become dependences as per Fig. 2 and yet the system could still violate the Bell
inequalities.
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of the EPRB correlations. While P(A,B | α,β) suggests that there is a correlation that
needs to be represented in a causal model of the EPRB experiment, the no-signalling
constraint and the faithfulness assumption prohibit any appropriate connection between
the relevant variables of the model.
3 Possible responses
Wood and Spekkens conclude that the EPRB correlations simply resist any causal expla-
nation and advocate a replacement of the formalism of classical probability theory with
some noncommutative generalisation (as per Leifer and Spekkens (2013)). While this is
certainly a clear direction out of the logical space circumscribed by their analysis, it is
not the only possible solution. Another open avenue, and one more amenable to causal
explanations of the EPRB correlations, is to question the strength of the faithfulness
assumption. After all, Wood and Spekkens justify maintaining this assumption on the
ground that it is a central assumption of causal discovery algorithms. (In defence of this
justification, we can imagine the motivation behind causal discovery algorithms as an
attempt to represent the process by which an agent might make causal inferences about
the world. And it would seem there is a sort of “Occam’s razor” principle when an agent
makes such inferences—agents do not usually expect there to be causal relations where
they see no statistical correlations.4)
But as with all such principles, it would be a surprise if such an expectation of causal
inference were exceptionless. Indeed, Cartwright (2001, p. 244) makes the claim that
there are many cases in sociology, economics and medicine in which significant caveats
are attached to the use of the faithfulness assumption. In such cases, we usually have
evidence of dependences and independences independent of the statistical observations
which we can use to guide any modelling of the causal relations in the system. When we
lack independent evidence, Cartwright (2001, p. 254) asks, what reason do we have for
assuming that faithfulness holds?
Where we don’t know, we don’t know. When we have to proceed with little information
we should make the best evaluation we can for the case at hand—and hedge our bets
heavily; we should not proceed with false confidence having plumped either for or against
some specific hypothesis—like faithfulness—for how the given system works when we
really have no idea.
Another option available to the advocate of a causal explanation of the EPRB correla-
tions is to provide independent motivation for why there is fine-tuning in some particular
case. Such an option is taken up by Egg and Esfeld (2014, p. 190) when they attempt to
defend Bohmian mechanics—which provides a causal model of the EPRB correlations—
from the challenge presented by Wood and Spekkens. They claim that Bohmian mechanics
does indeed avoid the possibility of superluminal signalling due to fine-tuning, and this
4Pearl’s (2009) illustration of this is that we do not expect a picture of a chair to be a picture of two
chairs positioned such that one hides the other (Wood and Spekkens, 2015, p. 9).
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X{x1, x2}
Y
{y1, y2}
Z
{z1, z2}
Figure 3: Causal sequence with multiple specific values.
fine-tuning is a consequence of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which proposes that
the configurations of Bohmian mechanics are randomly distributed according to the distri-
bution given in the Born rule. Insofar as the quantum equilibrium hypothesis is justifiable
on independent grounds (which itself is controversial, although see Du¨rr et al. (2012) for
a defence) we have a justification for why we expect there to be fine-tuning in specific
quantum scenarios.
There is, however, one possible response that I would like to focus on here, due to
Na¨ger (2015). The essence of this response is that the unfaithfulness displayed in the
casual relations of some system occurs in a stable way. Once we have accounted for
some unfaithful independence by identifying the existence of a fine-tuning of the condi-
tional probability distributions of some system, any change in background conditions that
disturbs these distributions would transform this unfaithful independence into a faithful
dependence (as we saw at the end of Section 2.1). Since in the case of EPRB correlations
we see the no-signalling constraint upheld in a range of conditions (indeed, its violation
has never been measured), we would require in this case a mechanism by which the un-
faithful independence is stable under an equivalent range of conditions. This is what
Na¨ger proposes.
Na¨ger (2015, p. 22) suggests that the fine-tuning mechanism in quantum mechanics
is what he calls internal cancelling paths. This mechanism is analogous to the usual
cancelling paths scenario (of the sort reprised by Cartwright (2001, p. 246)) in which
there are two or more causal routes between a pair of variables which act to exactly
counterbalance each other. In contrast to the usual case, however, the mechanism of
internal cancelling paths does not manifest at the level of variables, but at the level of
values. If we imagine that multiple specific values of a causal sequence of variables, X , Y ,
Z, as in Fig. 3, are pairwise related by conditional probabilities, P(yi | xi), P(zi | yi), and
further imagine that when these probabilities combine along the sequence from the initial
to the final variable all such sequentially combined probabilities lose their dependence
upon the initial pairwise conditional probabilities (P(zi | xi) is independent of i), then
we can see how it is possible for the final variable to lose its dependence on the value
of the initial variable. Thus, rather than a balance being achieved between two or more
causal routes connecting a pair of variables, in the case of internal cancelling paths we
have a balance being achieved between two or more sequences of pairwise conditional
probabilities connecting specific values of the variables. When the probabilities are right,
the dependence of the final variable on the initial variable vanishes.
For Na¨ger (2015, p. 22), the EPRB correlations display just such a mechanism, where
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the first variable of the sequence is the entangled state prior to collapse, the second is a
collapsed state and the third is the corresponding measurement outcome. Given suitable
specifications for the conditional probabilities between the values of these variables, the
probability of a measurement outcome is rendered independent of the value of the entan-
gled state prior to collapse. But the specific details and mechanism of Na¨ger’s treatment
need not concern us here. What is important for him in this case is that these pairwise
conditional probabilities are stable to disturbances of the system. Thus “if the laws of
nature are such that disturbances always alter the different paths in a balanced way, then
it is physically impossible to unbalance the paths” (Na¨ger, 2015, p. 26).
This then shapes as a nuanced response to the claim that the no-signalling constraints
and the principle of faithfulness rule out a causal explanation a` la Wood and Spekkens.
One of the most significant problems with violations of faithfulness is that such violations
ultimately undermine our ability to make suitable inferences of causal independence based
on statistical independence. It seems though that Na¨ger’s position circumvents such
problems by allowing only a specific kind of unfaithfulness—a principled or law based
unfaithfulness that is stable to background conditions. Whatever may be the mechanism
in the EPRB experiment, any violation of faithfulness must be universal (since we have
never measured any signalling between the two sides of the experiment). The sorts of
violations of faithfulness that are addressed by Cartwright (2001, p. 246) can be identified
as, say, ordinary path cancellation when we have some independent evidence of a causal
mechanism at work; such evidence may allow us to expose the elemental causal relations
that cancel in normal circumstances. Since there appears to be some in-principle lack of
epistemic access to the quantum state between preparation and measurement, we then lack
epistemic access to any purported causal mechanism underlying the EPRB correlations.
Thus we could never use such a mechanism to expose any violation of faithfulness (by,
say, revealing the elemental values of the internal paths that cancel), and this is of course
just a statement that the violation of faithfulness is stable.
The possibility of a stable violation of faithfulness portends the possibility of providing
a more detailed retrocausal model that employs such a mechanism. Let us consider what
such a model would look like now.
4 Quantum causal models and retrocausality
Interestingly, Na¨ger chooses the values of his internal cancelling paths to be conditional
probabilities. A more promising candidate for such values would be not probabilities but
probability amplitudes. This is more promising because we already know of an interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics that employs cancelling sums over probability amplitudes—
Feynman’s path integral formulation. What is more, there already exists a retrocausal
picture of quantum mechanics based on this formulation.
It might be enough at this stage to simply point to this possibility as a demonstration
that there is another viable avenue leading us out of the logical space circumscribed by
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the analysis of Wood and Spekkens. However, I would like to attempt to fill in some of the
detail of this alternative path—in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 I set out a more detailed retrocausal
picture and outline a possible blueprint of how cancelling probability amplitudes might
work for the EPRB experiment—and speculate in Section 4.3 as to how this might map
back onto the causal modelling program. I do not have a new causal modelling framework
to present here, but I contend that the current causal modelling framework is too blunt
an instrument to accommodate this retrocausal picture.
4.1 A more detailed retrocausal model
Wharton (2010b) (with further development in Wharton, Miller and Price (2011) and
Evans, Price and Wharton (2013)) argues for a retrocausal picture of quantum mechanics
based on Hamilton’s principle and the symmetric constraint of both initial and final
boundary conditions to construct equations of motion from a Lagrangian. Wharton treats
external measurements as physical constraints imposed on a system in the same way that
boundary constraints are imposed on the action integral of Hamilton’s principle. Focussing
solely on classical fields, Wharton argues that constraining such fields at both an initial
and a final temporal boundary (or a closed hypersurface in spacetime) generates two
strikingly quantum features: quantisation of the field and contextuality of the unknown
parameters characterising the field between the boundaries.5 Such contextuality of the
“hidden” parameters is precisely the feature we find inherent in the EPRB experiment.
Thus we get the following picture: a classical field constrained at both an initial and
a final temporal boundary permits by construction variables that are correlated with the
future measurement of the system; the final measurement does not simply reveal preex-
isting values of the parameters, but constrains those values (just as the initial boundary
condition would). From within Wharton’s picture, an invariant joint probability distribu-
tion associated with each possible pair of initial and final conditions can be constructed
(Wharton, 2010a, p. 318), and the usual conditional probabilities can be formed by con-
ditioning on any chosen portion of the boundary (Wharton, 2010b, p. 280). Probability
is then a manifestation of our ignorance: if we only knew the initial boundary, we would
only be able to describe the subsequent field probabilistically (due to the future con-
straint); given the final boundary as well, we would then be able to retrodict the field
values between the two boundaries.
As Wharton (2010b, p. 281) points out, this picture maps nicely to the Feynman
path integral representation of joint probabilities. According to this scheme, the joint
probability of particular initial and final state pairs is given by an integral over the classical
5That there are unknown parameters before the imposition of the final condition is ensured due to
the underdetermination of the classical field by the initial data.
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action (Wharton et al., 2011, p. 526):
P (ψi, ψf) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ ∫ 
 ∑
x,ti→y,tf
eiS/~

ψ∗f (y)ψi(x)dxdy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (1)
where S =
∫
Ldt.6 Here we have a (spatiotemporally defined) action constrained between
two temporal boundaries determining the behaviour of a system between the boundaries.
Of course this is only a general retrocausal framework and not a theory of quan-
tum mechanics. We can, however, get an idea of how to apply (1) within the retrocausal
framework by considering the example of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer from Wharton
et al. (2011, p. 529). Since such a system has highly localised initial and final conditions,
and sufficient redundancy in the set of possible paths through the experiment, the ex-
pression for the joint probability of particular input/output pairs simplifies to a sum of
amplitudes representing coarse-grained classical paths through the system with differ-
ent phases. Where amplitudes representing particular paths through the interferometer
cancel, the inference is made that those paths contain nothing “ontological”. (Of course,
Feynman warned against this sort of ontological interpretation of the path integral formu-
lation because the path integral sums complex amplitudes and not classical probabilities.
However, the main argument of Wharton et al. (2011) is to employ an action symmetry
as a justification for just such an ontological interpretation.) As far as this interpretation
goes, such empty paths—and indeed the non-empty paths—are constrained to be as such
by both the initial and final conditions constraining the system, as per (1) (after all, joint
probabilities do not distinguish past from future).
While Wharton et al. (2011) go on to consider a Bell inequality violating system based
on the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, a treatment of an EPRB experiment employing the
action symmetry of Wharton’s retrocausal picture can be found in Evans et al. (2013). As
a consequence of this action symmetry, it is argued that we should expect the quantum
state of the system between preparation and measurement in an EPRB experiment to be at
least partly characterised by beables encoding information about the future measurement
settings. This then circumvents Bell’s theorem by including an explicit dependence of
any hidden variables on the future measurement settings and, furthermore, provides an
“action-by-contact” explanation of the EPRB correlations (as we expect of retrocausal
models). Evans et al., however, do not provide an explicit account of cancelling probability
amplitudes for the EPRB experiment (as Wharton et al. (2011, p. 530) do for the Bell
inequality violating Mach-Zehnder interferometer) and thus they overlook an account of
how the no-signalling constraint might be met within Wharton’s retrocausal picture.
6And this scheme extends to QFT as a functional integral, again of the classical action:
P (φi, φf ) =
∣∣∣∣
∫
DφeiS[φ]/~
∣∣∣∣
2
.
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4.2 A suggestion for cancelling paths
One suggestion for how such an explanation of the no-signalling constraint might look,
however, can be found in a model of an EPRB experiment based on the same princi-
ple of cancelling probability amplitudes.7 According to this model, we simulate making
an intermediary joint measurement on the entangled pair of an EPRB experiment that
facilitates modelling each side of the experiment along the lines of Fig. 3, where Y is
the intermediary measurement. Upon doing so, we can reinterpret the joint probability
amplitude, Aαβ(a, b | ψ), for a particular pair of outcomes, a and b, as a result of some
measurements α and β in an EPRB experiment as being comprised of a sum of pairs of
such amplitudes: one of which, Aα′β′(µ, ν | ψ), representing a transition from the initial
state of the system, ψ, into an eigenstate of an arbitrary intermediary measurement, α′
and β ′; and the other of which, Aαβ(a, b | µ, ν)α′β′ , representing a transition from this in-
termediary state into the final state of the system, where we then sum over the outcomes
of the intermediary measurement, µ and ν, to erase any information gained about the
state (so long as the operators corresponding to the intermediary measurement settings
form a complete set of projectors).8
Employing the EPRB setup from Sec. 2.1, with measurement settings at α and β
chosen to be α1 and β1 respectively, we are free to make a novel choice for these ar-
bitrary intermediary measurements as the unmeasured settings from each side of the
experiment, i.e. α2 and β2. Since we are summing over the outcomes of the intermediary
measurement—of which there are four possibilities—the joint probability amplitude for
the actual outcomes is a sum of four amplitude pairs, the first of each pair (corresponding
to the joint outcome of the intermediary measurements) (i) factorises into two ampli-
tudes (a sort of locality condition) and (ii) can be straightforwardly evaluated given the
geometry of the experiment:9
Aα1β1(a, b | ψ) =
∑
µ,ν=±1
Aα1|α2(a | µ)Aβ1|β2(b | ν)Aα2β2(µ, ν | ψ), (2)
where ψ is the initial state, a and b are the outcomes on the α and β sides of the
experiment, respectively, and µ and ν are the respective intermediary outcomes.
The result of all this is that the joint probability amplitude for the actual outcomes,
Aα1β1(a, b | ψ), is a sum of the amplitudes corresponding to the unmeasured measure-
ment settings, Aα2β2(µ, ν | ψ), attenuated by coefficients encoding the geometry of the
relationship between the setting pairs (α1, α2) and (β1, β2). Since these coefficients take
on both positive and negative values, some amplitudes cancel leaving the joint probabil-
7With thanks to Gerard Milburn for the idea of this model and the formal detail. There are similarities
between this approach and that of Tucci (1995).
8This is, of course, just an abbreviated application of the composition law that Dirac (1933, p. 115)
and then Feynman (1942, p. 27) employ to derive the path integral approach to quantum mechanics.
9For instance, given a standard geometry for obtaining the CHSH inequalities, the values of the factors
Aα1|α2(a | µ) and Aβ1|β2(b | ν) are exclusively from the set {± 1√2}.
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ity amplitude of the actual outcomes to match the observed probabilities of the EPRB
correlations.
The way this has been constructed permits us to recognise this as an example of Na¨ger’s
internal cancelling paths, Fig. 3, where Y represents the intermediary state, Z represents
the final state and the cancelling path values are probability amplitudes between these
states (each indexed by the measurement pair {(αi, βj)}). And we can also recognise this
as a type of Feynman path integral approach to the EPRB correlations, one that we can
readily interpret along the lines of Wharton’s retrocausal picture. Explicitly, we find the
joint probability amplitude (2) to be a function of both the initial state ψ and the final
outcomes a and b. We can imagine these amplitudes as being in some sense the beables
that encode information about the future measurement settings α1 and β1, along the lines
of the treatment of the EPRB correlations in Evans et al. (2013).
A further interesting feature of this model emerges when, instead of summing over the
outcomes of the intermediary joint measurement, we simply model this measurement as
a weak measurement (that is, Y in Fig. 3 is a partially observed node).10 When such a
measurement is so weak that there is no measurement at all, we parallel the present case
where we sum over the intermediary outcomes and the probability amplitudes cancel in
such a way such that the final, actual outcomes match the observed probabilities of the
EPRB correlations (and thus we have a standard violation of the CHSH inequalities). At
the other extreme, when the intermediary measurement is a projective measurement, the
intermediary outcomes are simply eigenstates of the corresponding measurement opera-
tor and we subsequently destroy the correlations in the final outcomes (and the CHSH
inequalities will cease to be violated). Between these two extremes, a controllable par-
tial intermediary observation would seem to partially prevent the precise cancelling of
the probability amplitudes that gives us the EPRB correlations (and allow some sort of
‘tuning’ of the violation of the CHSH inequalities).
Again, as I mentioned above, this is not as it stands a full blown retrocausal theory
of quantum mechanics, it does however give a good idea of how an account of cancelling
probability amplitudes constrained at two temporal boundaries can explain the observed
correlations between measurement outcomes in an EPRB experiment.
4.3 Mapping to a causal model
It is interesting to consider how (or if) this retrocausal picture of the EPRB experiment
could be cast as a causal model. One option for such a model would be the causal model
represented in Fig. 2 that we considered earlier. According to this model, the initial
constraint, the preparation P , and the final constraints, the measurement settings α and
β, act symmetrically on the inaccessible variable λ to determine the beables that encode
information about the outcomes A and B. This is a DAG, as all edges are directed, and
10There are similarities between this feature of the model and the weak measurement framework of the
two-state vector formalism of Aharonov and Vaidman (1990, 1991).
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λ, by being spatiotemporally extended from the preparation to the measurement on each
side of the experiment, embodies the nonlocality of the EPRB correlations.
However, when we begin to consider the exact nature of the measurement settings and
outcomes in an EPRB experiment this raises a curious question about final boundary con-
ditions. In a typical CHSH experiment, the measurement angle is chosen by manipulating
a half wave plate which is then followed by a polarising prism and a pair of single photon
detectors. The measurement setting is the choice of direction of the half wave plate (the
effect of which is simply a unitary rotation of the polarisation state of the photon and
is thus a completely reversible operation). The measurement outcome occurs when one
of the detectors registers a photon, which indicates that a photon was present on the
channel from the prism to that detector (and the probability distribution over the two
outcome channels is conditional on the measurement setting). Thus there are aspects to
the measurement outcome that are externally imposed—the constraint imposed by setting
the half wave plate and the constraint imposed at the detector (that an integer number
of photons occupy the outcome channel)—and there are aspects that are a result of the
interrelation between the outcome and λ. The externally imposed constraints constitute
the final boundary conditions and, along with the initial boundary conditions, partially
determine the measurement outcome and, through this outcome, λ.
This suggests another way that we could cast the retrocausal picture as a causal model.
Consider Fig. 4: the preparation variable P is a direct cause of the hidden variable λ and
the measurement settings α and β are direct causes of the outcome variables A and
B and, in combination with the constraint imposed at each detector, provide a final
boundary for λ. Because of this interrelation between the variables, it is a little unclear
how the relationship should be represented; the quantum system between preparation and
measurement is just the ‘solution’ of a boundary value problem. Insofar as the boundaries
play a causal role in determining the solution, α, β and P are all partial causes of the
solution, while A and B are a final manifestation of that solution (and λ is some hidden
element connecting the other variables); hence the undirected edges in Fig. 4. This model
is, however, no longer a DAG11 and it remains to provide some account of how this model
fits within the analysis of Wood and Spekkens, to which we now turn.
As we saw above, there are (at least) two types of responses that can be made as a
consequence of the result that the three assumptions at the end of Sec. 2 cannot be held
simultaneously. The first response is the conclusion that Wood and Spekkens themselves
reach, that the EPRB correlations resist any causal explanation and thus we should
perhaps focus on amending the classical probability calculus that underpins Bayesian
networks in order to accommodate quantum mechanics. The second response is to weaken
the no fine-tuning assumption, and we have seen some different ways that we might do
that according to Cartwright (2001), Egg and Esfeld (2014) and Na¨ger (2015).
Let us consider the response aimed at weakening the no fine-tuning assumption. The
11Fig. 4 is obviously not directed, and arguably not acyclic as a result of the undirected edges.
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Figure 4: A different set of causal (and other dependency) relations for a retrocausal
model.
line of argument that has helped us reach this point seems to endorse that we simply
settle for the idea that the retrocausal picture of the EPRB experiment is an explicit
example of fine-tuning whereby the tuning is a result of the sum-over-paths nature of
the Feynman path integral approach. The subsequent unfaithfulness would be stable to
disturbances and thus meets the criterion set out by Na¨ger as a counterpoint to Wood and
Spekkens. Alternatively, rather than argue for stability of unfaithfulness, one could argue
that the nature of the sum-over-paths explanation of the fine-tuning provides independent
motivation for the violation of faithfulness, which would place this retrocausal picture in
the same camp as the use of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis for Bohmian mechanics.
According to such a view, the Feynman path integral approach would provide fundamental
insight into the nature of reality and this is the foundation of the absence of signalling in
the EPRB experiment.
But we could just as well interpret the retrocausal picture espoused here as endors-
ing that a causal explanation of the EPRB experiment, at least in the form of a DAG
interpreted as a Bayesian network, is not possible, but perhaps for different reasons than
Wood and Spekkens propose. To see this, consider the claim from Hausman and Wood-
ward (1999), based on an interventionist account of causation, that the nature of the
EPRB correlations shows that A and B are not two distinct systems. As the two undi-
rected edges of Fig. 4 suggest, there are connections between parts of the system that
do not allow for a ‘surgical’ intervention to be made on one variable in isolation of any
influence of the intervention on the other variables in the model—so-called ‘fat-handed’
interventions. When this is the case DAGs are simply inapplicable because the causal
Markov condition fails (in short, there cannot be a screening-off common cause) and
Hausman and Woodward (1999, p. 566) argue that the EPRB correlations are just such
a case. Our retrocausal picture, particularly modelled as in Fig. 4, is consistent with this
view.
There is an interesting take on this perspective, however. Hausman (1999) argues that
the lesson from the EPRB correlations is that it is possible for there to exist a (symmetric)
mutual dependence between variables of a system that is not a causal dependence. Such
16
variables, being mutually dependent, will have the same causes and effects. In the case of
the EPRB correlations, this mutual dependence between variables is clearly a nomological
dependence. According to Hausman (1999, p. 90), “Causal explanation is out of place
because the separate measurements do not have independent causes. The modularity
[absence of fat-handedness] that makes causal explanation appropriate does not obtain.”
Woodward (2014) makes a similar point. While arguing in favour of his interventionist
framework in the context of so-called ‘causal exclusion’ arguments, he suggests that it is
possible that there be non-causal dependency constraints characterising the relationship
between variables modelling some system. Such constraints are manifestations of a vi-
olation of what Woodward (2014, p. 14) calls “Independent Fixability”, whereby “it is
impossible. . . for some combinations of values of variables to occur and a fortiori for the
variables to be set to those values by interventions”. This is precisely the case with the
EPRB correlations, where some constraint is prohibiting, say, correlated or anti-correlated
values of the outcome variables given certain measurement settings; this non-causal de-
pendency constraint is just the mutual dependence or nomological constraint of Hausman.
Woodward ultimately argues that we can still probe the causal relations of a system by
interventions, but where we find non-causal dependency constraints such interventions
must be understood as operating to set constrained variables only to combinations of
values that obey the constraints. In other words, the constrained set of variables is inter-
vened upon as a whole (or, in Hausman’s terms, the mutually dependent variables have
the same causes and effects).
In this context, we could then imagine the undirected edges of Fig. 4 to be non-
causal dependency (nomological) constraints that prohibit the independent fixability of
the constrained variables. When we consider these undirected edges in this way, the
distinction between the constrained variables A, B and λ collapses; these variables are
intervened upon as a whole and have causes and effects as a whole. It is not immediately
clear whether this sort of schema can be accommodated as a straightforward modification
of standard causal modelling, or whether it can be accommodated at all. But I would
like to proffer one suggestion concerning how we might think of the undirected edges of
Fig. 4.
One way of thinking about causal relations from within a retrocausal picture is by
considering causation to be ‘perspectival’.12 The key to causal perspectivalism is to realise
that we have a spatiotemporally constrained perspective within the ‘block universe’ and,
from this perspective, we have limited epistemic accessibility to other spatiotemporal
regions; our notion of causation is a reflection of this. When we deliberate and act
as causal agents, we do so to bring about events that occur in those inaccessible and
unknowable regions of spacetime. In the current context, so long as at least some of those
inaccessible regions of spacetime are in the past—as is the case for the hidden variables
12See Price (2007), with further discussion of the view in, for instance, Sua´rez (2007), Silberstein et al.
(2008), Ismael (2009) and Evans (2015).
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of the above models (Evans, 2015, p. 13)—then we have retrocausal influences.
Thus we might imagine causal models to provide dependency relations between vari-
ables that we overlay with causal information that is a function of some set of temporally
and epistemically directed interventions that we make on a system, and this is ultimately
grounded in our perspective. The directed edges of a causal model, according to this view,
would then represent the direction in which information is gained about a system—which
is the standard Bayesian conception of causal models. We usually update information
from past to future, so the directed edges are usually temporally directed. With regards
to the undirected edges under consideration, it is not only the case that there is the po-
tential for these edges to be directed in the reverse temporal direction, but depending
upon the variables to which an agent can attribute values (i.e. the agent’s perspective),
the undirected edges have the potential to be directed in either temporal direction. Let
me make this point more concretely.
If we were to obtain information concerning the measurement outcome A, but lacked
information concerning the distant outcome B, we could tell a narrative regarding the
influence of A on λ, and the subsequent influence of λ on B. We would represent this
particular circumstance with corresponding causal arrows. Likewise, if we were to obtain
equivalent information concerning the measurement outcome B, but lacked information
concerning the distance outcome A, we could tell an alternative narrative regarding the
causal influences in the system, from B to λ and from λ to A. Neither would represent
any objective causal structure of the system, only the causal structure we see from our
perspective (whatever that happens to be). The objective structure would contain some
non-causal, nomological dependence as depicted by the undirected edges of Fig. 4. This
provides a novel conception of what causal models represent.
As one final suggestion, yet another perspective we could take on this retrocausal
picture is that the sum over complex probability amplitudes introduces a nonclassical
probability calculus over the classical probability structure of causal Bayesian networks
(this is, of course, just standard quantum mechanics). This would align such a retrocausal
account of quantum mechanics, at least in spirit, with the program advocated in Leifer and
Spekkens (2013). However, it is unclear how exactly one could represent the multitude
of probability amplitudes that contribute to each path’s probability neatly in a causal
model.
5 Conclusion
I set out to enumerate the responses available to an advocate of retrocausal explanations of
the EPRB correlations. Not all of these responses will be appealing, but the fate assigned
to retrocausal explanations by Wood and Spekkens—that such explanations violate “a
principle that is at the core of all the best causal discovery algorithms” and thus should
be ruled out—seems much less strong in the face of these responses. One line of response
is to explicitly disavow the sentiment that the faithfulness assumption is as sacred as
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suggested in order to maintain the causal modelling framework. I focussed, though, on
a second line of response, in which faithfulness is violated in a principled or law based
manner that is stable to background conditions, and which I take to have greater merit.
However, whereas Na¨ger argues that his version of a stable violation of faithfulness by
internal cancelling paths can save the central ideas of causal explanations, I consider a
retrocausal version of internal cancelling paths.
The retrocausal picture I present, and the model of cancelling probability amplitudes,
do not amount to a theory of quantum mechanics. This picture does, however, suggest an
interesting direction for retrocausal models. In particular, understanding the connection
between the weak measurement interpretation of the intermediary measurement in the
model of Section 4.2 and the two-state vector formalism of Aharonov and Vaidman (1990,
1991) could provide a promising avenue of research.
I make the suggestion that, perhaps, the causal modelling framework is not sufficiently
rich to accommodate the nature of retrocausal influences; certainly not of the sort I
describe here. I think there is more to be done in this regard—for instance, is there an
appropriate graphical representation that can capture the nuanced causal relationships
of this picture? I hope to have provided here at least the beginnings of an exploration
of this. Regardless of the success or otherwise of such a program, the door is certainly
not closed on retrocausal approaches to quantum mechanics based on the framework of
causal modelling.
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